Introduction
In Dr. Jeremiah Abalaka v Minister of Health & 2 Ors[1].(“Dr. Abalaka’s case), the Supreme Court (the “Court”) has stated that suits challenging the composition of administrative tribunals/investigative panels (which are quasi-judicial bodies created by law), or the violation of the rules of natural justice by such quasi-judicial bodies, cannot be commenced as an action for the enforcement of fundamental rights under Section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) (the “1999 Constitution”) and Order 11 Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 2009 (“FREP Rules”).
The established position of the law is that administrative tribunals/investigative panels (the “investigative bodies”) are quasi-judicial bodies created by law, whose decisions are equivalent to the decisions of a court of law created under Section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution.[2]
Because of the status of their decisions, an appeal against the decision of a quasi-judicial body such as the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee[3](LPDC) or the Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal[4] (MDPDT)will be to the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, respectively.
However, if an aggrieved party believes that a quasi-judicial body is likely to violate their fundamental rights guaranteed under Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution, the Court has clarified that the proper way to seek redress at the High Court is not through a fundamental rights enforcement action.
Facts of the Case
The Appellant, Dr. Abalaka claimed he had developed a treatment for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”). Following this claim, the 3rd Respondent, the Medical & Dental Practitioners Investigation Panel (the “Panel”) invited him regarding their investigation into the allegations of professional misconduct connected to his cure for HIV. After receiving the invitation, Dr Abalaka instituted proceedings against the Minister of Health (1st Respondent), the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria (2nd Respondent), and the Medical and Dental Practitioners Investigating Panel (3rd Respondent) at the Federal High Court to enforce his fundamental rights.
Dr. Abalaka asked the court to declare that the Respondents were under the control and authority of the Minister of Health and bound to carry out any directive he gives them; the Respondents’ independence and impartiality to carry out any judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings were compromised by the appointing powers of the Minister; it was unconstitutional for the 2nd Respondent to set up a tribunal to try him for an action he did not know was an offence at the time of the occurrence etc.
The Federal High Court dismissed Dr Abalaka’s case and held that the reliefs sought were outside the scope of Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution. He appealed to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, which also dismissed his appeal.
The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Court, in the lead judgment by Justice Uwani Musa Abba Aji JSC, dismissed Dr. Abalaka’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court noted that the Federal High Court and the Court of Appeal should have struck out the suit for lack of jurisdiction because Dr Abalaka’s claims and reliefs in his suit did not fall within the ambit of the provisions of Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution.
However, the concurring judgment of Honourable Justice Emmanuel Akomaye Agim, JSC, presented a unique perspective, which was not considered in the lead judgment. While the judge agreed with Dr. Abalaka that there is a likelihood that the proceedings of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents could violate his right to a fair hearing, the judge also stated that they were not courts or tribunals and as such the likely violation of Dr. Abalaka’s right to a fair hearing could not amount to a violation of his right to a fair hearing protected by Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution. The relevant excerpts are reproduced below:
Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution from its words deals with the determination of the civil rights and obligations of a person in cases before a Court or a tribunal established as such by law. In other words, it applies only to proceedings before judicial bodies established as such by law and does not extend to all bodies acting judicially or quasi judicially including domestic or standing ad hoc tribunals or panels raised departmentally or in an organisation to investigate into or inquire into or hear complaints in the department or organisation. Therefore, a complaint that the proceedings and decisions of the Respondents violate or are likely to violate the rules of natural justice against him and his general legal right to fair hearing is not a complaint that any of the provisions of Chapter IV has been, is being or is likely to be contravened and cannot be brought to the High Court by way of an application to remedy the violation or likely violation of fundamental right under Section 46(1) of the Constitution and the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. ….. the appropriate method to challenge the decisions of such non-judicial bodies acting judicially or quasi-judicially is by an application for judicial review by the writ of certiorari or prohibition or declaration or by any of the ordinary methods of legal actions like writ of summons, originating summons or originating motion under the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules.
The Binding Nature of the Principle of Fair Hearing on Quasi-Judicial Bodies
According to the interpretation provided by the learned judge, investigative, administrative, or quasi-judicial bodies do not qualify as courts or tribunals established by law. As a result, any complaints regarding their proceedings—such as violations of the right to a fair hearing—cannot be pursued as fundamental rights actions.
This view contradicts the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in cases like Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee v Gani Fawehinmi[5], where the Court held that the principle of fair hearing or natural justice applies to purely administrative bodies, which are expected to act fairly in the exercise of their duties, especially where their decisions affect the rights and obligations of people.
In Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) v Gani Fawehinmi, Chief Gani Fawehinmi SAN (“Chief Fawehinmi”) was accused of engaging in advertising, touting and publicity because of a newspaper publication by him, which read as follows: “A New Book on Nigerian Constitution titled Nigerian Constitutional Law Report 1981, Volume One, edited by Chief Gani Fawehinmi, the famous reputable Nigerian lawyer.”
The LPDC served Chief Fawehinmi two (2) charges under Section 10(1)(a) of the Legal Practitioners Act. It is noteworthy that Chief Fawehinmi filed a Motion Ex-parte seeking an Order Nisi of Prohibition to restrain the LPDC, as constituted, from hearing the matter. Chief Fawehinmi argued that the composition of the LPDC was tainted and it could not independently judge the complaint before it without bias. The High Court agreed with him.
On appeal, the LPDC argued that it was merely an administrative authority and, therefore, not bound by the rules of natural justice or provisions of Section 33 (1) of the 1979 Constitution, and its direction could not amount to a judicial or quasi-judicial decision. The Supreme Court rejected the LPDC’s argument and held that the LPDC was a tribunal created by Sections 9 and 10 of the Legal Practitioners Act to determine cases of professional misconduct and inflict punishment on deserving Legal Practitioners. Therefore, it was a quasi-judicial body whose direction is equivalent to sentences passed by a court of law after conviction or finding of guilt.
Implication of the Supreme Court’s Decision
The decision in Dr. Abalaka’s case appears to establish a strict procedural rule regarding actions to enforce fundamental rights against the decision of quasi-judicial bodies. This means that complaints regarding the composition and proceedings of these quasi-judicial bodies must now be addressed through the conventional mode of commencing civil actions, such as originating summons, originating motion, writ of certiorari, prohibition, or declaration.
However, it remains to be seen if the adoption of a Writ of Summons to commence an action against a quasi-judicial body will not elongate the process of justice delivery because of its contentious nature as opposed to an Originating Summons or Motion. Additionally, there is the concern that this judgment may have opened the door for procedural/technical objections against fundamental right actions against quasi-judicial bodies commenced under Section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution and Order 11 Rule 1 of the FREP Rules.
Notwithstanding, the court has a duty to do substantial justice in every case presented before it and avoid bowing to the lure of technicalities.[6]
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dr. Jeremiah Abalaka v Minister of Health & Ors underscores a pivotal moment in Nigeria’s administrative and constitutional jurisprudence, regarding the enforcement of the right to a fair hearing.
The judgment aims to define the limits of judicial oversight, but it also raises significant questions about access to justice and the protection of fundamental rights outside of judicial settings. As stakeholders address the resulting procedural and substantive challenges, it is essential for the legal community to champion reforms that balance administrative efficiency with the principles of constitutional justice.
[1] (2025) LPELR-81491 (SC).
[2] Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee v Gani Fawehinmi (1985) LPELR-1776 (SC).
[3] Section 12(7) Legal Practitioners Act; Iyomon v LPDC (2024) LPELR-80155 (SC).
[4] Section 16(6) Medical and Dental Practitioners Act; Ralu v Medical & Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (2025) LPELR-81420 (CA).
[5] Supra
[6] Alioke v Oye & Ors (2018) LPELR-45153 (SC).
